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Patricia May and Brandon J. Bosch 
16 Theories of public opinion 
Abstract: While the issue of citizen competency has vexed scholars throughout 
history, the modern concepts of a mass public and mass media are relatively new. 
Beginning with the seminal works of Lippmann and Dewey, we chart the evolving 
theories of public opinion, from the "hypodermic needle" model of the early twen-
tieth century to the more psychologically oriented approach to media effects of 
today. We argue that in addition to understanding how audiences process media 
content, theories of public opinion must account for how media content is con-
structed and disseminated, which is complicated by the ever-changing nature of 
our media landscape. 
Keywords: Public opinion, mass media, gatekeeping, media effects 
1 Introduction 
Popular discourse about public opinion tends to revolve around key issues of the 
day. Citizens bemusedly ask themselves how the public comes to hold a particular 
view on a given issue. Voters anticipate how political candidates will strategize 
and frame an issue to garner the most support possible. And individuals consume 
hews stories and read blogs on the internet, later taking advantage of comment 
boxes to share their perspectives. 
Academic endeavors related to public opinion focus on the same issues. They 
examine the process by which information gets presented, how citizens learn about 
issues, and the effects of this information on attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors. 
However, scholarship on public opinion is not only empirical in nature: research 
ih this area is undergirded by a strong set of normative assumptions. For example, 
Who constitutes the public? What should the members of an ideal citizenry know 
about politics and how engaged should they be in the political process? Should 
an 1pinion grounded in emotion carry as much weight as an opinion based on 
information? 
In studying the aforementioned processes, public opinion scholars inextricably 
lihk public opinion to the functioning of democratic SOCiety.! Given this view of public 
--1 Thf>orists have noted that public opinion plays a major force regardless of the political system 
ih which one finds oneself. Invoking john Locke's law of opinion, reputation, and fashion, Noelle· 
Neumann (1995) specified how public opinion plays a critical role in promoting social integration. 
This view of public opinion as a form of social control has allowed researchers to study public 
OPinion in small-group settings and other venues that are not ostensibly political in nature. 
In Handbook of Communication Science. Vol. 1: Theories  and Models of Communication, edited by 
Paul Cobley and Peter J. Schultz, 289-308. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2013. Used by permission. 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/product/44608?rskey=BWE2QE&result=5
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opinion as instrumental for democratic processes, the theories covered in this chapter 
encompass decades of scholarship that are based on distinctly different assumptions 
of the public as members of a democratic system. In addition, particularly as studied 
vis-a-vis communication, these theories focus on different outcomes, and as our 
media landscape continues to evolve, the field must reconsider the impact of each. 
Although the term "public opinion" was not coined until the mid-1700s (see Peters 
1995 for a review), our point of departure is the early twentieth-century intellectual 
debate between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey, whose differences in perspective 
reflected longstanding debates and would trickle down through the decades to create 
a rich corpus of literature. The Lippmann-Dewey debate is critical as its key concerns 
are reflected in the various theories of public opinion, all of which involve media 
effects. We review the key perspectives on media effects and public opinion theories 
over the past century, and end with a discussion of how these theories need to be 
revisited in light of an increasingly technologically oriented media environment. 
2 Early twentieth-century perspectives 
2.1 Views of the public: Lippmann vs. Dewey 
From ancient Greece onward, citizen competence has been at the heart of many 
debates about the public. Questions about whether citizens were sufficiently 
knowledgeable to rule or whether governance should be left to Plato's philosopher 
Idngs have emerged consistently over the years. Indeed, this remained the crux of 
how public intellectual Walter Lippmann and theorist John Dewey saw the public 
in the early 1900s. 
Lippmann, in his oft-cited books Public Opinion (1922) and The Phantom Public 
(1925), painted a pejorative portrait of the public - one that was unable to process 
information deeply or to behave rationally. In Public Opinion, Lippmann relied on 
the allegory of the cave, from Book VII of Plato's The Republic. In this story, a 
group of men has been chained together in a cave since childhood. The chains 
prevent them from moving their legs or turning their heads; consequently, they 
are able to see only that which passes before them. And because a fire as well as 
the mouth of the cave are behind them, the chained men see nothing but the 
shadows cast upon the wall of the cave as others might walk by. The allegory 
ends, "And if they were able to talk with one another, would they not suppose 
that they were naming what was actually before them?" 
Lippmann presented another allegory in Public Opinion, one set in 1914 at the 
onset of the Great War. Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans lived on an island, 
sufficiently remote that it received mail once every two months. When the mail 
arrived in mid-September 1914, they learned how their respective countries had 
been engaged in hostilities. "For six strange weeks they had acted as if they were 
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friends, when in fact they were enemies" (Lippmann 1922: 3). Lippmann used these 
two examples to illustrate how indirectly citizens know the environment in which 
they live. Acknowledging how "the real environment is altogether too big, too com-
plex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance," he contended that citizens were 
"not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permuta-
tions and combinations" (16). As a result, citizens are forced to rely on what they 
can to create for themselves trustworthy pictures of the world beyond their reach. 
Naturally, the mass media playa critical role in the construction of these pictures. 
As much as citizens can use the media to learn about their unseen lifespace, 
they inherently cannot process mediated information fully. Lippmann (1922: 30) 
identified several factors as limiting access to the facts: 
They are the artificial censorships, the limitations of social contact, the comparatively meager 
time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs, the distortion arising because 
events have to be compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small 
vocabulary express a complicated world, and finally the fear of facing those facts which would 
seem to threaten the established routine of men's lives. 
Hence, his skepticism that citizens were able to contribute significan.t1y to demo-
cratic processes. 
Just as Aristotle's view of the public was antithetical to Plato's, Lippmann's 
perspective generated much response, most notably from philosopher and educa-
tion reformer John Dewey, who expressed considerably greater optimism regarding 
the populace. Like Lippmann, he recognized that citizens were imperfect, but his 
Aristotelean perspective emphasized the supremacy of public opinion as the best 
safeguard to democracy (Bullert 1983). Is there potential to strengthen our citi-
zenry, and if so, how? Dewey, in his seminal work Tile Public and its Problems 
(1927), argued that to help an entity "largely inchoate and unorganized" (109), 
structural changes were needed: "The essential need ... is the improvement of the 
methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem 
of the public" (208). Indeed, for Dewey, it was necessary to foster "conditions 
under which the Great Society may become the Great Community" (147). 
Dewey's thinking reflected a profound concern with improving how citizens 
learned and how they could reach their fullest potential. In his works (e.g., The 
Logic of Inquiry, 1938), he advocated the use of logic, supported application of the 
sCientific method, and argued that the use of reasoning should be linked to policy 
and social concerns. 
Though most reviews of Lippmann and Dewey tend to juxtapose them as 
almost diametrically opposite in thought, the two strands of thinking are aligned 
With each other. As Sproule (1997: 97) noted, "Their ideas fed a view that the weak-
minded and dangerously neurotic public could not be trusted to take intelligent 
Pdlitical action without formal training, supported by quantitative assessment, in 
how to think." Nonetheless, this debate would transcend time and implicate the 
Views of how researchers saw citizens being influenced by messages they received. 
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2.2 Media influences on public opinion 
Studies that assess the extent to which messages shaped public opinion go lock-
step with studies of media effects in general. The earliest conceptions of media 
effects were of powerful media exerting great impact on relatively passive audien-
ces' driven by both scholarship and the applied communication studies from which 
the communication discipline was born. In this section, we discuss perspectives 
that took hold in the first half of the twentieth century. 
2.2.1 All-powerful media and propaganda effects 
The earliest conceptions of media effects - as having direct, powerful effects -
emerged from a confluence of events. In the United States, the publication of Upton 
Sinclair's The Jungle in 1906 elicited a hue and cry from the mass American public 
that led to the passage of federal acts and an oversight agency that ultimately 
would become the Food and Drug Administration. Over two decades later, in 1929, 
US researchers began to examine the effects of motion pictures on children and 
youth. These Payne Fund studies, named after the sponsoring foundation, found 
that young viewers emulated what they witnessed in these films (see Lowery and 
DeFleur 1995). And in 1938, the radio broadcast of H. G. Wells' War of the Worlds, 
telling the story of Martians landing on Earth, produced panic as many listeners 
believed the broadcast to reflect real-time reality (Cantril 19LfO). 
Alongside these developments existed a growing body of research on propa-
ganda, particularly in the context of World War I. Harold Lasswell (1927: 214), in 
his dissertation examining propaganda techniques used by all sides during this 
global struggle, contended that modern war is fought not only on military and 
economic fronts, but also on the propaganda front. After all, the countries at war 
were motivated to rouse patriotic fervor, increase citizens' commitment to the war, 
and portray their enemies in a negative light and demoralize them. 
Lasswell's focus on propaganda highlighted as its primary goal the influencing 
of opinion (see Welch 2003 for a range of definitions). Indeed, both propaganda 
and public opinion involve phases of human behavior, with the former evoking 
negative connotations. Doob's (1948: 240) definition of propaganda considers it 
"the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals 
toward ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular 
time," Citing numerous channels through which propaganda can be transmitted -
newspapers, radio, books, plays - Doob illustrates that it is more than just a tool 
for deployment in international conflicts. 
Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that scholars began to gravitate toward 
a view of the media as omnipotent. Contemporary academic discourse tends to use 
different terms to describe the media power of this era - the "magic bullet" theory 
or the "hypodermic needle" model, the latter of which some scholars claim derived 
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from the notion of immunizing an audience against propaganda (Chaffee and 
Hochheimer 1985). 
2.2.2 Two-step flow 
The view of media as all-powerful lost traction as Klapper (1960: 8) summarized 
two decades of research, concluding that "mass communication ordinarily does 
not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather func-
tions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences." Resonating 
with this view is the work of Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at Columbia Uni-
versity's Bureau of Applied Social Research, whose studies of various communities 
revealed that mass media did not influence citizens' behaviors directly, as would 
be posited by the hypodermic needle or magic bullet models. Rather, media exerted 
their influence on individuals by virtue of influencing key members of the public 
identified as opinion leaders, people viewed by others to be influential. 
This two-step flow of communication emerged across a number of settings. In 
the political realm, as shown in Lazarsfeld et al.'s (19LI8) seminal study of citizens 
in Erie County, Ohio, during the 1940 election, voters who changed their minds 
during an election campaign or made up their minds late in the campaign were. 
more likely to mention being influenced by others. Citizens also reported greater 
exposure to interpersonal discussion of politics than mediated coverage of politics. 
In addition, those individuals identified as opinion leaders reported greater expo-
sure to the mass media than did their followers. Another community study based 
on residents of Elmira, New York during the 1948 election season led researchers 
to conclude that one's social system mattered in decision-making (Berelson et al. 
195/f). This view would later be dubbed the "Columbia model" or sociological 
model of voting. 
Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) built on the conclusions that emerged from these 
two community studies, focusing on how personal influence worked in non-politi-
cal domains. They examined the process of influence in marketing, movie-going, 
and fashion decisions as well as in the domain of public affairs. However, instead 
oflooldng only at self-reports generated by disparate individuals, Katz and Lazars-
feld also studied the individuals whom opinion leaders considered their opinion 
leaders and the sociodemographic and personality traits they possessed. In the 
end, this study investigated the diffusion of an idea over time through the social 
structure of an entire community (Katz 1957). Other early studies of opinion leader-
ship adopted innovative ways of shedding light on this concept: Merton (19LI9) 
identified as opinion leaders those individuals whom a minimum of four people 
had listed as shaping their opinions, and in their study of doctors, Menzel and 
Katz (1955) found that the diffusion of a new drug could be traced through the 
social structure of the medical community. 
In reviewing these initial studies, Katz (1957: 72) noted that people may be 
more influential than the media in changing opinions as personal influence is 
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generally non-purposive, flexible, and trustworthy. These studies set the stage for 
media and interpersonal communication to be viewed as competitive channels, 
which others would later show to be more complementary than competitive (Chaf-
fee 1982; Rogers 1983). 
3 Contemporary theories of public opinion 
Coinciding with the cognitive turn in the social sciences in the 1970s, media schol-
arship moved away from the so-called "minimal effects" paradigm associated with 
critiques made by Klapper (1960). With the advance of several new communication 
theories and phenomena, scholars began to gravitate toward a return to all-power-
ful media (primarily as individuals turned to the media to help themselves define 
social reality). Only later would they acknowledge the presence of contingent 
media effects - that powerful media effects occurred some of the time for some 
individuals. This section presents the key contemporary theories of media effects 
on public opinion. 
3.1 Agenda~setting 
Entirely bypassed by the earlier scholarly focus on media persuasion (Kosicki 
1993: 231), agenda-setting came to light in a landmark study by McCombs and 
Shaw (1972), who found that the issues considered most important to Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina, voters were also the same issues covered by news media in Chapel 
Hill. Referencing the now-famous words of Bernard Cohen (1963: 13) that "the press 
may not be successful all the time in telling people what to think, but it is stun-
ningly successful in telling its readers what to think about," McCombs and Shaw 
(1972) concluded that news media are capable of influencing the political agenda 
of the pUblic. 
The several hundred studies of agenda-setting conducted in the four decades 
since the Chapel Hill study indicate considerable robustness of the phenomenon. 
Although studies tend to operationalize media coverage by analyzing easily acces· 
sible newspaper coverage and correlating that coverage with survey data, experi-
mental research has shown that agenda-setting effects exist for televised content 
as well (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Researchers have investigated agenda-setting 
effects for short-term issues as well as long-term national concerns such as the 
1980s War on Drugs (Gonzenbach 1996); for news processed in hard-copy format 
and online (Althaus and Tewksbury 2002; Schoenbach et a1. 2005); for local and 
non-local issues (Palmgreen and Clarke 1977); for entertainment content (Holbrook 
and Hill 2005); for visual content (Coleman and Banning 2006); and across a wide 
array of individual countries as well as comparatively (Peter 2003). 
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Despite the general robustness of agenda· setting effects, research has identi-
fied a number of factors that mitigate or enhance their magnitude. Some of these 
factors have generated mixed findings, while others appear more consistently in 
the literature. For instance, interpersonal discussion can enhance agenda-setting 
effects (McLeod et al. 1974), dampen them (Atwater et al. 1985), or both (Wanta 
and Wu 1992). 
Level of issue obtrusiveness, however, has over the years emerged as a gener-
ally consistent and significant moderator of the media's agenda-setting effects. 
Namely, media coverage of unobtrusive issues ~ those issues with which individu-
als have little or no direct experience ~ will have stronger agenda-setting effects 
as the public will need to rely more on the media for information about those 
issues (Zucker 1978). 
Related to the level of issue obtrusiveness, agenda-setting effects can be mod-
erated by one's need for orientation (Weaver 1977), or the extent to which individu-
als are driven to situate and more fully understand an issue. Need for orientation 
comprises two dimensions ~ relevance and uncertainty, with the former serving as 
the initial necessary condition! people who do not perceive an issue to be relevant 
will not need to orient themselves on this topic. However, among those who per-
ceive an issue to be relevant to them, there is variance in their levels of uncertainty· 
about that issue. Individuals who have aU the information they need on a relevant 
issue (or are low in uncertainty) will be lower in their need for orientation than 
individuals who perceive an issue to be highly relevant yet have insufficient infor-
mation (see McCombs and Reynolds 2009 for a review). These patterns do not elide 
the fact that even incidental exposure to media messages can have significant 
consequences. As McCombs (2004) illustrates, the strength of agenda-setting 
effects is not monotonic, increasing as media exposure increases; rather, it 
approaches asymptote after a certain level of exposure. 
Matthes (2006) called for the study of need for orientation toward not only 
issues, but also facts (e.g., "I want to know many different sides about that topic") 
and journalistic evaluations (e.g., "1 attach great importance to commentaries on 
this issue"). The latter resonates with findings showing that audience members' 
perceptions of media credibility and knowledge can moderate agenda-setting 
effects (Miller and Krosnick 2000; Tsfati 2003; Wanta 1997). 
3.2 Priming 
Although the theory of agenda-setting specifies a relationship between media sali-
ence of an issue and public salience of that same issue, it says very little about 
What individuals do with the media content to which they have been exposed. 
Borrowing from psychologists, who define priming as "the fact that recently and 
frequently activated ideas come to mind more easily than ideas that have not been 
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activated" (Fiske and Taylor 1981l: 231), communication scholars view this concept 
as an extension of agenda-setting, referring to the power of media to effect 
"changes in the standards that people use to make [political] evaluations" (Iyengar 
and Kinder 1987: 63; brackets added). 
Like agenda-setting, priming works because individuals tend to rely on mem-
ory-based processing of information. Rather than forming attitudes based on 
impressions (sometimes called on-line processing, McGraw et al. 1990), individuals 
tend to retrieve information that is more salient (Hastie and Park 1986). Scheufele 
and Tewksbury (2007: 11) succinctly juxtaposed agenda-setting and framing: "By 
making some issues more salient in people's mind (agenda setting), mass media 
can also shape the considerations that people take into account when making 
judgments about political candidates or issues (priming)." 
Studies of priming on topics not ostensibly related to public opinion have 
found fertile ground in assessing media violence, sexual content in the media, 
racial representations, and advertisements (Carpentier 2011). However, such con-
tent has strong implications for attitudes toward censorship, stereotyping, and con-
sumer purchase behaviors. In the public opinion domain, however, the criterion 
variable of interest has tended to be judgments of politicians. In their seminal 
study of the agenda-setting and priming effects of US television, Iyengar and Kin-
der (1987) found that the more attention paid to a specific problem, the more likely 
that viewers incorporated what they knew about that problem when assessing the 
President (see also Pan and Kosicki 1997, and for similar findings related to the 
governor of Hong Kong, Willnat and Zhu 1996). Looking at evaluations of presiden-
tial performance, research has found that media coverage of an issue does increase 
the ease with which related beliefs are accessed, but do not find priming effects. 
Rather, politically knowledgeable citizens in the US who trust the media more infer 
news coverage of that issue to reflect greater importance of that issue and therefore 
tend to use that issue as a standard for evaluating the President (Miller and Kros-
nick 2000). 
The literature on priming offers many nuanced findings. For instance, unlike 
in studies of presidential evaluations, priming effects have not been found for 
interest groups (McGraw and Ling 2003). And although many priming studies 
assume that audiences use the dominant news agenda in their evaluations, 
research shows that "big-message" effects are just one part of the story: recent 
exposure to relevant content can generate priming effects, but cumulative exposure 
plays a greater role (Althaus and Kim 2006). 
With few exceptions, such as those examining public support for military con-
flicts (Althaus and Coe 2011), priming research today remains focused on formal 
political actors, but has moved to other sites of political news. This shift is particu-
larly important, given that political news can appear in many forms (e.g., Entman 
2005). In the United States, late-night comedies such as The Late Show with David 
Letterman are found to influence which traits audiences use to evaluate presiden-
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tial candidates (May et al. 2005), with documentaries (e.g., Fahrenheit 9-11, Holbert 
and Hansen 2006) and fictional programming such as The West Wing (Holbert et 
al. 2003) and NYPD Blue (Holbrook and Hill 2005) also able to shift the basis of 
evaluations of presidents. These findings, however, are contingent on many indi-
vidual-level factors, including political ideology and political interest. 
3.3 Framing 
Often discussed in tandem with agenda-setting and priming, framing refers to 
media influences based on what media coverage of an issue includes. Despite 
being characterized as a "fractured paradigm" with "scattered conceptualization" 
(Entman 1993: 51), framing enjoys generally consistent definitions. According to 
Entman (1993: 52), framing highlights certain aspects of the world in a text "as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation." Similarly, Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 1lf3) 
define a frame as "a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to 
an unfolding strip of events .... The frame suggests what the controversy is about, 
the essence of the issue." Likewise, Reese (2001: 11) sees frames as "organizing 
principles that are socially shared and persist over time, that work symbolically to 
meaningfully structure the social world." In short, scholars view frames as provid-
ing meaning about social phenomena through the highlighting and packaging of 
information. 
The bulk of research on framing effects has either identified types of frames 
that exist or tested their effects. On the former front, one common dichotomization 
involves episodic vs. thematic frames. Whereas episodic frames adopt a case-study 
perspective on an issue or portray just one incident, thematic frames provide 
greater contextualization and background, linking that particular incident to larger 
concerns. Not surprisingly, individuals exposed to these frames differ in their attri-
bution of responsibility on political issues (Iyengar 1991): episodic frames lead 
audience members to attribute responsibility of an issue to the individual involved, 
while thematic frames increase the lil<elihood of blaming the government or society 
at large. 
Policy vs. strategy frames constitute another common way to differentiate news 
frames. Usually appearing in the context of election coverage, policy frames focus 
On substantive issues as well as issue-based information from candidates or parties 
(Patterson 1993). Strategy frames, on the other hand. emphasize the sport of elect-
oral politics (Farnsworth and Lichter 2007). Often termed "horse-race coverage" -
which focuses on which candidate is winning or losing, and by how much - strat-
egy frames are charged with undermining the electoral process by diverting citi-
zens' attention away from the issues that really matter (Cappella and Jamieson 
1997; Patterson 1993), though others claim that the drama of horse-race coverage 
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makes news coverage more memorable and can generate interest in a campaign 
(Bartels 1988). 
Because framing is inherent in media coverage. the range of studies in this 
area is considerable (see, for example, the case studies in Reese et a!. [2001] which 
include examinations of media frames of political correctness and those of a mur-
der trial). Studies of individual-level framing effects. however. have examined gains 
vs. losses (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) and ethical vs. material frames (Domke et 
a!. 1998); compared human interest, conflict, and personal consequence frames 
(Price et al. 1997); and looked at similar frames including those emphasizing attri-
bution of responsibility or economics (Valkenburg et al. 1999). While these afore-
mentioned experimental studies highlight the effects of a particular type of frame, 
other experiments test for the effects of framing of a specific incident. Notable 
studies include framing a Ku Klux Klan rally as a free-speech issue vs. a disruption 
of public order (Nelson et al. 1997) and framing the Supreme Court ruling of the 
2000 U.S. presidential election as partisan and "stealing the election" vs. a princi-
pled vote based on legal considerations (Nicholson and Howard 2003). Findings 
show that respective levels of support for the Ku Klux Klan and Supreme Court 
differed depending on the frame to which study participants were exposed. 
Framing influences how people understand issues, but their effects are contin-
gent on many individual-level factors. After all, in making sense of media messa-
ges, audience members not only consider to varying degrees media content, but 
they also engage with each other interpersonally (Druckman and Nelson 2003; 
Walsh 2004) and draw on their experiential knowledge (Gamson 1996). 
Beyond the cognitive frames that affect citizens' understanding of the specific 
issue at hand (Iyengar 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1981), the media can shape 
audience members' understanding of related concerns by adopting cultural 
frames - frames that "don't stop with organizing one story, but invite us to ... [go] 
beyond the immediate information" (Reese 2001: 12-13). One exemplar of a cultural 
frame is the "war on terrorism" frame, which "offered a way ... to construct a narra" 
tive to make sense of a range of diverse stories about international security, civil 
wars, and global conflict" (Norris et a1. 2003: 15). 
Although scholars differentiate framing from agenda"setting in that they see 
the former as concerned with the quality and content of media coverage of an 
issue and the latter as concerned with only the amount of coverage, some argue 
that framing can be understood as another type of agenda-setting effect. In other 
words. agenda setting can influence the public's perception of salience of an issue 
as well as how it understands that issue (McCombs 2004). Whether or not framing 
is its own concern or another extension of agenda-setting seems to hinge on the 
theoretical mechanisms. Some scholars stress that agenda-setting and priming 
operate via accessibility, noting how exposure to media coverage about an issue 
increases its accessibility in one's mind, while framing effects are marl<edly differ~ 
ent, relying instead on applicability effects (e.g., Price and Tewksbury 1997). In 
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other words, when an issue is framed in terms of meaning, cause, solution, and 
responsibility, "the primary effect of [that] frame is to render specific information, 
images, or ideas applicable to [that] issue" (Tewksbury and Scheufele 2009: 21). 
4 Conclusions 
This chapter focused on key theories of public opinion as they implicate individual-
level effects on citizens' attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions. Viewing these theo-
ries through this lens suggests a singularity or simplicity that simply does not exist. 
Agenda-setting research has looked at how media agendas can set policy agendas 
(Rogers et a1. 1993) or other media's agendas (Atwater et a1. 1987), and framing 
research has differentiated between frame-setting and frame-building (Scheufele 
1999). Indeed, to truly understand public opinion, we must not only understand 
the nature of the public and the assumptions that undergird research efforts, but 
also the nature of mass media. This point was recognized early by Lippmann 
(1922), whose views on the individual and news media led him to reject the possi-
bility of an informed mass public. Toward this end, we briefly review the literature 
on key factors that feed into the construction of news, recognizing that, as Shoe-
maker and Reese (1996: 251) noted, "mass media content is a socially created prod-
uct, not a reflection of an objective reality" (see also Tuchman 1978). 
4.1 A key caveat: the construction of media content 
To begin, who determines what is news? What forces within the news media serve 
as gatekeepers (White 1950) and what forces will shape how content gets pre-
sented? At the most micro level, journalists who create news stories and their 
editors may unknowingly shape content. Their sociodemographics as well as politi-
cal views and training, and their perceptions of norms all have some bearing on 
what and how content gets presented. For instance, newspapers with male mana-
ging editors produce more coverage of politics and national security over time, 
while female-led newsrooms produce more indirect leads, a practice common in 
the crafting of features or news features stories (Beam and DiCicco 2010). Similarly, 
the relationship between journalists' partisanship and their news decisions 
appears not only in the United States, but also in Western Europe (Dons bach and 
Patterson 2004). Differences exist across countries as well, particularly in terms of 
profeSSional norms: compared to British, Italian, Swedish, and German journalists, 
American journalists most strongly advocate for a free press, and are more likely 
to rely on interviews with newsmakers and citizens than on wire-service copy to 
cover stories (Donsbach and Patterson 2004). 
300 - Patricia Moy and Brandon J. Bosch 
Perhaps most salient as a professional norm of journalism (at least in the 
United States) is that of objectivity, which holds that journalists should report 
facts rather than values and present multiple perspectives on a story (Schudson 
2001: 150). Paradoxically, this norm tends to introduce its own bias - an overreli-
ance on officials and, coupled with a need for newsworthy sources, encourages 
indexing. Indexing occurs when the types of viewpoints presented in news media 
tend to be calibrated to "the range of views expressed in mainstream government 
debate about a given topic" (Bennett 1990: 106). The indexing hypothesis has 
received empirical support (e.g., Livingston and Bennett 2003; Zaller and Chiu 
1996), but has also been refined to account for the ability of presidential adminis-
trations to influence media coverage more than members of Congress (Entman 
2004). However, other scholarship suggests that journalists are often relatively 
autonomous in their reporting (Althaus 2003: Patterson 1993). Notably, journalists 
appear to reject frames from elite politicians and interest groups in favor of framing 
that heightens the dramatic elements of a news story (Callaghan and Schnell 2001), 
highlighting the importance of ratings and economics in news production. 
Indeed, economic factors need to be taken into account when considering how 
media content is created (Sparrow 1999). For example, the division of labor associ· 
ated with the newsbeat system maximizes the efficiency of news collection, though 
this "news net" is typically cast around "big fish" such as prominent officials and 
political leaders (Tuchman 1978). To avoid costly original research, journalists rely 
on credible institutions and elite officials for information (Gans 1979; Sigal 1973). 
Put differently, the "free" information provided by elite officials and institutions 
essentially amounts to a subsidy to the news industry (Cook 2005; Fishman 1980). 
Thus in the same way that news media are dependent upon advertising for reve· 
nue, so are journalists dependent on credible sources. 
Scholars have also painted to the effects of media ownership and economics in 
the production of media content. The study of the political economy of news media 
is presaged by Marx and Engels' (1845/2004: 64) comment that "the class which has 
the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over 
the means of mental production." Some scholars argue that since news media organi-
zations are owned not only by wealthy individuals, but also by corporate conglomer· 
ates and dependent upon corporate advertising, news media content will tend to 
have a pro-corporate capitalism bias (Herman and Chomsky 1994; McChesney 2004, 
Parenti 1992). However, much of the evidence in support of this claim is anecdotal in 
nature. Moreover, a content analysis found only limited support of news media syn-
ergy bias, which occurs when news media outlets provide more favorable coverage 
of products and businesses owned by the parent company (Williams 2002). 
In fact, outside the realm of news media, many unfavorable depictions of cor· 
porations exist in popular media. Lichter et al. (1997) find that business characters 
were depicted negatively more often (550/0) than non-business characters (31o/a) on 
television. Whether it be linking capitalism with the murderous creature in Alien 
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(1979) and consumerism with mindless zombies in Dawn of the Dead (1978) (Ryan 
and Kellner 1988), or simply depicting the mundane corporate workplace as a 
threat to masculinity (Hunter 2003), capitalism often is shown in a threatening 
light on film. Given the conSistently negative depictions of labor unions in film 
(Christensen and Haas 2005; Puette 1992), it makes more sense to think of mass 
media as an arena of competing themes, rather than as articulating a single ideol-
ogy (Ryan and Kellner 1988). 
Although cited as a potential motivation of corporate bias, the need for profits 
can work to produce media critiques of capitalism. According to Kellner (1981: 40), 
the profit motive can trump class ideology; for instance, "the short-term economic 
interests of a network may lead them to broadcast news which puts in question 
aspects of the socioeconomic order, thus jeopardizing their long-range economic 
interests." Focusing on the economic pressures facing news organizations, Hamil-
ton (2004) argues that network news programming has more "soft" news coverage 
(focusing less on politics) and is liberal on social issues in order to appeal to 
18-34 year-old females. who are a prime demographic for advertisers. 
At the most macro level, the construction of news and media content in general 
can be influenced by broader cultural forces. Entman (1993: 52) notes that along 
with the communicator, text, and receiver, frames reside in culture. Similarly, Van 
Corp (2007) speaks of a "cultural stock of frames" from which both journalists and 
audiences draw upon to make sense of the world. However, different views exist 
regarding the actual influence of culture on news coverage: Hallin (1986) argues 
that coverage is influenced by the cultural consensus surrounding that issue. while 
Gans (1979) finds news content to be characterized by "enduring values" such as 
ethnocentrism, individualism. small-town pastoralism. and responsible capitalism. 
By referring to something resident in the surrounding culture, media frames have 
implicit cultural roots" (Tewksbury and Scheufele 2009: 23) and can resonate with 
audience members (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). 
4.2 Some final words about the changing face of public 
opinion 
Conceptualizations of agenda-setting, priming, and framing as media effects on 
public opinion emerged in an era that was relatively simple compared to today's 
environment. But as citi.zens have turned increasingly to social media and other 
Online tools, the field has begun to question the extent to which one can separate 
mass from interpersonal influences (Mutz and Young 2011) or even the directional-
ity of effects. Agenda-building, which identifies how specific entities can shape 
the media's agenda, now needs to explicitly include citizens as active newsmakers. 
If media conten t is being crafted by the individuals that previously were being told 
by the media what issues to think about. perhaps the theoretical premises of 
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agenda· setting should be refined. Similarly, groups and individuals that previously 
had difficulty finding voice through traditional media outlets now have the oppor-
tunity to create their own frames and bypass journalistic filters. If frame sponsor-
ship no longer belongs only to elites, and if citizens are setting frames for the 
media, scholars should reconsider the extent to which hypothesizing about tradi-
tional (media-to-audience) framing effects is useful. 
As our media landscape becomes more balkanized and fragmented, society 
has witnessed an increase in selective exposure and a shift toward what Bennett 
and Iyengar (2008) term "a new era of minimal effects." Indeed, the long-held 
stages of media effects described here are being questioned: Neuman and Guggen-
heim (2011) eschew categorizing effects in terms of their power on audience mem-
bers, proffering instead a six-stage model of media effects that turns on clusters of 
theories. According to their typology, we have been operating, since 1996, under a 
"new media theories" framework. 
But what are new media? Today's latest technology will likely lose novelty with 
the appearance of the next one, but not before it has become fully integrated into 
everyday politics. Information will continue to be sent for the sake of information; 
messages will continue to be sent to mobilize others to take action; and non-
elites will continue using these technologies to join the swelling ranks of citizen-
journalists (Cooper 2010). Taken together, these acts of engagement signal how the 
dichotomies of yore no longer hold. Social media have flattened hierarchies, and 
media consumers have become producers. With this increased engagement in the 
media, citizens can find virtually unlimited information on an issue. Unfortunately, 
this proliferation of media can kindle distrust in sources that espouse dissonant 
views from one's own. These tensions call for a re-examination of how communica" 
tion is defined. They also force a reconsideration of who is the source and who is 
the receiver, and more importantly, how these new communication processes will 
shape public opinion in a democracy. 
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